Team Kimberlin Post of the Day


While I’ve openly published a great deal of material related to Team Kimberlin’s online harassment of and lawfare against their perceived enemies, I’ve actually kept a lot of information under wraps in order to protect third parties or to avoid revealing legal strategies while case were in process. That’s basic operational security. Team Kimberlin has not always been good at OPSEC.

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OPSEC or Operational Security is the process of protecting little bits of data that could be grouped together to give the bigger picture. During my service in the Signal Corps, a significant portion of my work revolved around keeping information hidden from potential enemy access.

I especially remember one particular breach of OPSEC in Viet Nam. There was a major who thought that he was too important to have to bother with the rules. One day, he got in a hurry and decided that he didn’t have to get up and walk a couple of hundred feet to where an encrypted radio was installed. He used the radio in his jeep to send a very brief message that would have no tactical value after about a half-hour. The VC were listening, they figured out what was going on, and—15 minutes later—a landing zone took mortar fire just as a general’s helicopter was landing. There were no casualties, except for that major’s career.

Here’s another example of poor OPSEC. pbrstreetgang.org is one of the domains associated with others owned or controlled by Team Kimberlin. Bill Schmalfeldt published an email with this header just over a week ago. The version below has part of the Bcc line redacted. The original doesn’t. Can you bust someone back to a rank lower than Cabin Boy?BSmailheader

Incoming!

UPDATE—Several people have wondered how I received an email not addressed me. I didn’t. A .png image of the email was published on Twitter.confessiontweet

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I couldn’t make this stuff up on my own.

Yeah, That’s Right! Poor OPSEC!


After being tipped of about this Tweet …i94radio201510300218Z… I was reminded of this post—

OPSEC

Originally Posted on 14 August, 2013

OPSEC or Operational Security is the process of protecting little bits of data that could be grouped together to give the bigger picture. During my service in the Signal Corps, a significant portion of my work revolved around keeping information hidden from potential enemy access.

I especially remember one particular breach of OPSEC in Viet Nam. There was a major who thought that he was too important to have to bother with the rules. One day, he got in a hurry and decided that he didn’t have to get up and walk a couple of hundred feet to where an encrypted radio was installed. He used the radio in his jeep to send a very brief message that would have no tactical value after about a half-hour. The VC were listening, they figured out what was going on, and—15 minutes later—a landing zone took mortar fire just as a general’s helicopter was landing. There were no casualties, except for that major’s career.

Here’s another example of poor OPSEC. pbrstreetgang.org is one of the domains associated with others owned or controlled by Team Kimberlin. Bill Schmalfeldt published an email with this header just over a week ago. The version below has part of the Bcc line redacted. The original doesn’t. Can you bust someone back to a rank lower than Cabin Boy?BSmailheader

Incoming!

UPDATE—Several people have wondered how I received an email not addressed me. I didn’t. A .png image of the email was published on Twitter.confessiontweet

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About ten hours after that post went up here at Hogewash!, all of the Kimberlin-related websites went down for several days. When they came back, pbrstreetgang dot org had moved to another server and was no longer being used as a name server for Kimberlin-related sites.

#CabinBoy Question of the Day


Inquiring minds want to know, and there are a lot questions that Bill Schmalfeldt could answer that would satisfy the curiosity of some of those minds. Here’s a question for today:

On 5 August, the Cabin Boy sent an email to the Carroll County State’s Attorney’s Office which begins, “Well, I seem to have done it for a third time.” The Bcc line contains the email address “<ops@pbrstreetgang.org> Gang.” What are the names of the intended Bcc recipients of the email?

Of course, we shouldn’t expect an answer.

UPDATE—It’s been suggested that my putting forward a question about the Cabin Boy’s behavior may somehow muddy the water in the various upcoming legal proceedings. Whatever. Schmalfeldt is grabbing hold of anything he can find at this point. I suspect if I went completely silent on him for until the hearing in mid October, he would rant about what I was doing in secret.

He’s been dancing around the edges of the peace order since the afternoon it was issued. He has stepped over the line from time to time. His false tu quoque defense is factually, logically, and legally impaired, and it strikes me as just that he should be held to account for his actions.