While I’ve openly published a great deal of material related to Team Kimberlin’s online harassment of and lawfare against their perceived enemies, I’ve actually kept a lot of information under wraps in order to protect third parties or to avoid revealing legal strategies while case were in process. That’s basic operational security. Team Kimberlin has not always been good at OPSEC.
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OPSEC or Operational Security is the process of protecting little bits of data that could be grouped together to give the bigger picture. During my service in the Signal Corps, a significant portion of my work revolved around keeping information hidden from potential enemy access.
I especially remember one particular breach of OPSEC in Viet Nam. There was a major who thought that he was too important to have to bother with the rules. One day, he got in a hurry and decided that he didn’t have to get up and walk a couple of hundred feet to where an encrypted radio was installed. He used the radio in his jeep to send a very brief message that would have no tactical value after about a half-hour. The VC were listening, they figured out what was going on, and—15 minutes later—a landing zone took mortar fire just as a general’s helicopter was landing. There were no casualties, except for that major’s career.
Here’s another example of poor OPSEC. pbrstreetgang.org is one of the domains associated with others owned or controlled by Team Kimberlin. Bill Schmalfeldt published an email with this header just over a week ago. The version below has part of the Bcc line redacted. The original doesn’t. Can you bust someone back to a rank lower than Cabin Boy?
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I couldn’t make this stuff up on my own.